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White Death

Belaya Smert’- the White Death, was the fate which awaited more than 200,000 Red Army soldiers in the forests of Finland between December 1939 and March 1940. While the ‘phony war’ paralysed the western front in Europe, a bitter and desperate encounter took place in the sub-arctic forests of Finland and on the Karelian Isthmus, within earshot of Leningrad. Over 1,500,000 soldiers were involved on both sides. This was the Winter War.

White Death is an account of what happened. Drawing on contemporary sources (Finnish, Swedish, Soviet, British, French, American and German papers as well as a host of secondary works) it is a story of incompetence, misunderstanding, tragedy and heroism. That Finland survived it is a miracle of history. That she retained her independence after the larger conflict (outside the scope of this book, but currently in preparation) is another.

The Winter War tested Finland almost to destruction. It also tested Russo-German relations, so solid in the light of the Molotov pact and the invasion of Poland, as well as the resolve of the soft and hard left of Western Europe, previously unified by events in Spain. It offered Anglo-French diplomacy its biggest challenge yet – to intervene on behalf of the Finns and risk war with the Soviet Union as well as Germany, or to maintain normal relations with a state whose publicly declared agenda was the destruction of Western democracy. It also caused a three-month freezing of Diplomatic relations between Hitler and Mussolini.

The savage political infighting, between left and right, allies as well as enemies, left a legacy which would have profound effects in the late spring and early summer of 1940 as the German war machine stepped up a gear. The smoking ruin that was Anglo-French entente after the fall of France had its roots in the utter failure of joint policy – under a League of Nations mandate – to assist Finland in her greatest hour of need. For Germany, her (public) failure to assist Finland served well to build up the trust required for her to buy time before the attempted destruction of the Soviet Union in June 1941. Certain German commentators, observing the plight of the Red Army, drew their own conclusions. That they were quite wrong in their assessment is one of the greatest ironies of modern history.

For the Red Army showed an astonishing ability to refocus itself in the light of early failure. Initiatives which prefigure the disaster of Summer 1941 are observable here, as the very machinery of state control over the army is suspended – individual leadership and initiative are, briefly, brought to the force – a high-risk strategy for Stalin in the aftermath of the purges.

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